Cornell Law Review
Volume 87
Issue 2 January 2002

Article 12

Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias:
A Critical View
William N. Eskridge Jr.
John Ferejohn

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William N. Eskridge Jr. and John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 616
(2002)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol87/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

STRUCTURING LAWMAKING TO REDUCE
COGNITIVE BIAS: A CRITICAL VIEW
William N. Eskridge,Jr.t & John Ferejohntt
The most interesting issues of public law (for us) are those relating to institutional design and function. When thinking about statutory interpretation, judicial review, and legislative and administrative
procedures, it is useful to have a theory about how the governmental
system works in our regulatory state, how it breaks down, and how it
leads to decisions that do not serve the public interest. Hence, theories of regulatory pathology are useful. Within the academy, public
choice theory has been particularly popular: selfish interest groups
and public officials highjack the governmental process for their private gain, thereby undermining the public interest in efficient rules
and distributions. The main regulatory pathology for public choice
theory is rent-seeking, the private plunder of the public fisc. Republican theory offers a less cynical point of view. It maintains that politics
is the forum where collective problems are resolved and values are
advanced. The main regulatory pathology for republican theory is
breakdowns in the deliberative process.
Theories of cognitive psychology are highly relevant to both these
schools of thought, because these theories are informed judgments
about how even the most well-motivated human decisionmakers make
mistakes. Our provisional view, expressed in Part I, is that cognitive
psychology, in its current state of development, is best deployed as a
critical theory which supplements our understanding of the operation
of interest group pressure, institutional interaction, and the process of
policy debate and deliberation. At this point, cognitive psychology
does not constitute a new descriptive theory of the regulatory state,
nor does it have any particular normative contribution beyond banally
observing that rational actors better advance their goals by making
accurate rather than biased judgments. Currently, cognitive psychology does not even constitute a body of learning telling us what agents
will do; it only tells us that agents will fall short of whatever it is they
t John A. Garver Professor ofJurisprudence & Deputy Dean, Yale Law School. Deputy Dean Eskridge submitted testimony (for which he was compensated) before the House
Committee on the Judiciary regarding the topic and analysis presented in Part III of this
Comment and has been a consultant (without compensation) in litigation against the Bush
Administration's suspension of funding for stem cell research discussed in Parts I and II of
this Comment.
tt
Carolyn S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.
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ment platform, or some larger social malaise that infected Americans
after Vietnam. Still, unless legal scholarship is going to be dismissed
as a solipsistic enterprise in which the participants talk only to each
other, academics must accept some responsibility for shaping the prevailing cultural story of what regulatory government is about, how well
it is accomplishing its mission, and why it sometimes fails to advance
the public welfare. Whether intentionally or not, "public choice
talk"240 has given an intellectual imprimatur to bureaucrat bashing,
and an aura of scientific certainty to the assertion that government
"causes more problems than it solves." 24 1 As Bruce Adams, former
director of the Office of Personnel Management and dean of two
prominent schools of public administration, has observed: "[A]mong
elites, cynicism toward government has become, in a perverse way, a
'242
mark of cultivation.
Describing the value and the limits of theoretical models, John
Braithwaite points out that "[t]heories of institutional design are useful as metaphors that supply competing ways of imagining changes in
direction for social policy. They are rarely useful in supplying eternally true sets of propositions. '' 243 We do not claim that the cognitive
model ineluctably generates an exhaustive and determinate set of
specifications for designing perfect regulatory institutions. We do suggest that it offers a new set of metaphors for understanding the vulnerabilities, and the capabilities, of public policymaking processes.
Political scientist Peter DeLeon's examination of the history of the
policy sciences in relation to the theory and practice of American democracy ends by expressing concern that "the analytic priesthood is
doing little to discourage the ebbing of American's faith in government and, by extension, the democratic system. ''244 If legal theory is
not to merit this same criticism, it must find ways of thinking about
government that are pragmatically optimistic: i.e., ways which do not
deny the presence of self-interest and ambition, but which refuse to
place such motivation at the center of civic behavior; ways which willingly acknowledge that regulatory failures occur, but which evaluate
failure claims with the open-minded determination to understand and
learn rather than the gleeful anticipation of being able to say "I told
you so!" The cognitive model, we believe, represents one such way.
The phrase is Jerry Mashaw's. See MAsHAW, supra note 5, at 28.
See supra note 146. For an early and eloquent expression of concern about the
social costs of public choice talk, see Steven Kelman, "PublicChoice" and Public Spifi 87
PUB. INT. 80, 93-94 (1987); cf.John Ferejohn, It's Not Just Talk, 85 VA. L. REv. 1725, 1727
(1999) (discussing reality and substantiality of such "discourse effects"); Pamela S. Karlan,
Politicsby Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697 (1999) (identifying costs of using market metaphors to analyze electoral processes).
242
Adams, supra note 229, at 6.
243
Braithwaite, supra note 233, at 365.
240
241

244

PETER DELEON, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICY SCIENCES 100 (1997).

STRUCTURING LAWMAKING TO REDUCE
COGNITIVE BIAS: A CRITICAL VIEW
William N. Eskridge, Jr.t &John Ferejohntt
The most interesting issues of public law (for us) are those relating to institutional design and function. When thinking about statutory interpretation, judicial review, and legislative and administrative
procedures, it is useful to have a theory about how the governmental
system works in our regulatory state, how it breaks down, and how it
leads to decisions that do not serve the public interest. Hence, theories of regulatory pathology are useful. Within the academy, public
choice theory has been particularly popular: selfish interest groups
and public officials highjack the governmental process for their private gain, thereby undermining the public interest in efficient rules
and distributions. The main regulatory pathology for public choice
theory is rent-seeking, the private plunder of the public fisc. Republican theory offers a less cynical point of view. It maintains that politics
is the forum where collective problems are resolved and values are
advanced. The main regulatory pathology for republican theory is
breakdowns in the deliberative process.
Theories of cognitive psychology are highly relevant to both these
schools of thought, because these theories are informed judgments
about how even the most well-motivated human decisionmakers make
mistakes. Our provisional view, expressed in Part I, is that cognitive
psychology, in its current state of development, is best deployed as a
critical theory which supplements our understanding of the operation
of interest group pressure, institutional interaction, and the process of
policy debate and deliberation. At this point, cognitive psychology
does not constitute a new descriptive theory of the regulatory state,
nor does it have any particular normative contribution beyond banally
observing that rational actors better advance their goals by making
accurate rather than biased judgments. Currently, cognitive psychology does not even constitute a body of learning telling us what agents
will do; it only tells us that agents will fall short of whatever it is they
t John A. Garver Professor ofJurisprudence & Deputy Dean, Yale Law School. Deputy Dean Eskridge submitted testimony (for which he was compensated) before the House
Committee on the Judiciary regarding the topic and analysis presented in Part III of this
Comment and has been a consultant (without compensation) in litigation against the Bush
Administration's suspension of funding for stem cell research discussed in Parts I and II of
this Comment.
tt Carolyn S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.

616

2002]

STRUCTURING LAWMAKING

619

vate groups without any public-regarding justification. 4 This is a relatively cynical view of government, and that cynicism has been a big hit
with academics and the general population alike in the last forty years.
We believe that the underlying reason for this popularity is that, since
1960, the American people have become increasingly distrustful of
others generally, with that generic distrust pervasively affecting their
views of the government. 5 If this trend continues (and there is every
reason to think that it will), public choice theory will be a permanent
part of our intellectual landscape.
Vigorously disagreeing with the public choice understanding are
various participatory theories that can be conveniently labeled republican.6 Thinkers in this tradition maintain that interest groups are captured and even defined by the political process as much as vice versa,
for our political "interests" do not preexist the process. Rather than
viewing the process as a cost of purchasing laws, republican theorists
view the democratic and deliberative process as value-added: citizens
enjoy participation, everyone learns from it, and the result is law that
is likely to reflect the public interest. 7 This understanding of politics
axiomatically views rent-seeking as a pathology, but maintains that
rents will be distributed only when the process of participation and
deliberation becomes corrupt because (1) groups of citizens have
been excluded or discouraged from participation, (2) the process has
been secretive or below the public radar screen, or (3) decisionmakers have made up their minds before they receive ideas and
input from the public and those with expertise.
Various other important theories offer distinct perspectives about
the regulatory process. Positivepolitical theory (PPT) focuses on the interactions among political institutions, each of which is engaged in a
special function and has policy preferences which are aggregated into

4 The normative goal assumed by most public choice theorists is overall social efficiency: a distribution of public money or power that benefits more people than it hurts.
Some public choice theorists have posed the goal as overall political efficiency: distributions that accurately reflect the salience and power of interest groups.
5
See ROBERT D. PutrNA, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
CONIMUNrnr 29-180 (2000), for the proposition that American group activities have steadily

declined since 1960, which Putnam interprets as a decline in social capital and an increase
in distrust for one's neighbors. Our further interpretation is that this phenomenon is
related to Americans' increasing distrust of government during the same period.
6 For introductions, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Governmen 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); and Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic RepublicanJustificationfor the
BureaucraticState, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
7 See, e.g.,JosEPH M. BESSErr, THE MIL VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 48 (1994); AMY GUmT~,NN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 1-3 (1996).
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law and implementation choices." Like public choice theory, PPT is
concerned with the divergence of the public interest and lawmaking
or implementation by Congress, agencies, and (maybe) courts delegated lawmaking authority by Congress. Unlike most variants of public choice theory, this divergence is usually interpreted as a result of
ideological motivations-the idea that political agents have their own
views about what is in the public interest. 9 The PPT critique focuses
on the potential for opportunistic behavior by public officials rather
than on the crass suggestion that policy will be auctioned to the highest bidder; this kind of opportunistic behavior is sometimes called
"ideological shirking."
Another rational choice approach is informational theory, which
maintains that the legislature creates specialized institutions (committees and agencies) in order to generate and transmit information
about the issue being deliberated. 10 Although useful information can
come from these specialized organs, it does not change the underlying PPT dynamic of political bargaining by ideologically motivated officials and materially motivated interest groups. The key idea is that
ideologically motivated officials will generally lack the incentive to
generate or transmit information optimally.1 1 Informational theory's
distinctive policy pathology would be disruption of the means by
which reliable information is generated and deployed within the legislative or implementation process.
With some caveats, theories of cognitive limitations are potentially relevant to regulatory pathologies under the foregoing schools
of political science. At the outset, we note that most of the cognitive
psychology literature focuses on individualdecisional biases. This part
of the literature is potentially relevant to decisionmaking in the regulatory state, but the literature focusing on biases in either group or
(best of all) institutionaldecisionmaking is obviously much more relevant. Concededly, most cognitive heuristics should operate in institutional as well as individual decision processes, but the former ought to
8

For an overview, see generally WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRO-

DUcriON TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973); and Symposium, PositivePolitical Theory and
Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
9 It is possible to give a materialist interpretation to the PPT policy space, but such an
interpretation is less general than the ideological one. One can always interpret the pursuit of one's private material gain as an ideology, but such an ideology would typically lack
the persuasive rhetorical resources that ideologies are normally thought to possess.
10

See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).

11 Recent work on theories ofjury decisionmaking, which assumes that all agents have
the desire to make the right decision, suggests that similar informational distortions arise
here. These distortions arise from the fact that even though they are identically motivated,
jurors have private information that they must aggregate into a decision. See David AustenSmith &Jeffrey S. Banks, InformationAggregation, Rationality, and the CondorcetJury Theorem,
90 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 34 (1996).
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generate different kinds of biases; also, the biases that will skew individual decisionmaking the most might affect group decisionmaking
much less. We also note that, at this point, the cognitive psychology
scholarship offers no overall normative insights into regulatory pathology beyond the banal idea that accurate and unbiased decisions better
serve the decisionmaker's goals than inaccurate and biased ones.
The relevance of the psychological literature is most obvious for
deliberative theories. Such theories are optimistic that participants in
the political process will act out of more than merely selfish motives,
and that groups of public-regarding public servants working together
can generate genuine solutions to public problems. 12 If the pathology
of rent-seeking recedes in such models, another pathology replaces it
once deliberative theories are enriched by the insights of cognitive
psychology. That is, even if the deliberative process is not sidetracked
by interest group biases, it can still be sidetracked by cognitive biases.
For example, a committee tackling the issue of global warming can
reach disastrously wrong conclusions not just by pandering to the interests of industrial polluters (the public choice problem), but also by
making simple but predictable mistakes in reasoning (the cognitive
psychology problem). In the abstract, cognitive psychology suggests
that committees will tend to make the following kinds of mental
mistakes:
The committee might overgeneralize from dramatic and emotionally striking events (the availability heuristic)' 3 or from

small unrepresentative

samples

(the representativeness

heuristic).14

12 It is instructive to look at Rousseau's Social Contract to see how even republican
theorists are not naively optimistic, only relatively so. SeeJEAN-JACQUES RouSSEAu, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968). In the later parts of the
book Rousseau criticizes late republican Rome for having a secret ballot; however, he recognizes that by the late period, public life had become corrupt enough that public voting
would have been abused (by vote buying and intimidation). Thus, while he praised republican forms, of course, Rousseau was by no means Pollyannaish. In a nearby passage, where
he criticizes political parties and factions, Rousseau says (realistically) that if you cannot

actually get rid of them altogether, it is best to encourage lots of them to form and compete with each other. Cf THE FEDERAIUST No. 10 (James Madison) (describing the evils of
"faction").
13 See RICHARD NisB=mr & LEE Ross, HuNiAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, 185 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1124, 1127-28 (1974); see also W.
Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 EcoN. J. 1657 (1997)
("alarmist bias").
14 See NISBET & Ross, supra note 13, at 17-28, 36-42; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman,Judgments of and by Representativeness,inJUDGMIENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIAsEs 84 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:616

" The committee might anchor its decisionmaking on an arbitrary starting point and filter factual evidence through the lens
of that bias (anchoring or cognitive dissonance). 15
* The committee might impute its members' own views and preferences to everyone else, an assumption that reflects lack of
empathy or understanding of others' different situations (the
egocentrism bias).16
" The committee might tend to defer to experts (the expert-deference bias, also hypervigilance)1 7 who themselves tend to be
overconfident about their conclusions (the overconfidence
8
bias).1
" If the committee is composed of like-thinking persons, deliberation might tend to skew the committee's conclusions toward
positions more extreme than those with which the members
started (the polarization effect).19 Conversely, more heterogeneous committees may tend to avoid the best solutions if they
seem too radical (the extremeness aversion).20 In either event,
there is a danger that committee members will go along with a
proposal only because they think "everyone thinks this way"
2
(the cascade effect).
" If the problem is complex, the committee may be overwhelmed
and paralyzed (information overload) or driven away from correct but extreme positions (the dilution effect) 22 by considering too much information, and may consequently be unduly
15

See, e.g.,

LEON FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE

(1964); PamelaJ.

Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and DebiasingMethods on Predictions of
Novice Performance; 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 205, 217 (1999); Stefan SchulzHardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 655, 666 (2000).
16
See, e.g., Raymond

S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What
Others Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 739 (1999).
17
See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 81 (1977).
18
See, e.g., Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing ofEvidence and the Determinantsof
Confidence 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992); Hinds, supra note 15, at 217.
19

See, e.g.,

ROBERT

S.

BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION

73-79 (1992); B. AUBREY FISHER & DONALD G. ELLIS, SMALL GROUP DECISION MAKING 55-56
(3d ed. 1990); Cass R. Sunstein, DeliberativeTrouble? Wly Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 74-77 (2000).
20
See, e.g., Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, in RESEARCH ONJUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 69, 82-84 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogath eds., 1997) (extremeness aversion); Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and
Compromise Effects, 16J. CONSUMER RES. 158 (1989).
21
See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leadingthe Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi &

Kathryn Jeruli eds., 1995).
22
See, e.g., Philip E. Tedock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the
Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388, 396 (1989).
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deferential to other decisionmakers (hypervigilance, noted
above) .23

Cognitive psychology raises red flags about deliberative theories even
if all participants are public-regarding. More information is not always optimal, two heads are not always better than one, and the early
24
bird does not always get the worm.
Although not as obvious, cognitive psychology also has relevance
to those public choice and other theories that assume rational decisionmakers operate under conditions where they receive perfect information. Cognitive theory suggests that rational decisionmaking given
perfect information is an even stronger (more unrealistic) assumption
than conventionally believed, but the consequences of this observation are unclear and are probably quite complex. On the one hand,
this might augur even more dismal prospects for American democracy. For instance, officeholders who are beholden to particular interest groups will tend to anchor their policy judgments on those
interests and view the evidence through the lens of those interests. In
this way, cognitive psychology helps us understand how interest-groupdriven representatives can have public-regarding self-images: they
have fooled themselves as well as the voters! Moreover, representatives will make mistakes when weighing their needs to accommodate
interest groups that are especially noisy and intense, as the availability
and representativeness heuristics will sometimes lead officials to overestimate the power of those constituencies. On the other hand, cognitive errors afflicting interest groups themselves might dilute rentseeking under some circumstances. For example, an interest group
might go along with a measure limiting the rents it extracts if the
group mistakenly defers to government experts or allows the government to frame the issue. 25 In short, bad cognition by public officials
can open opportunities for rent-seeking, but bad cognition by rent
seekers may leave many of these nefarious gains unexploited.
Consider President George W. Bush's recent decision allowing
federal funding of stem cell research only involving already-existing
lines of stem cells. We do not know the details of the President's deliberative process. Although press accounts suggest that it was as thorough as anything the President will ever decide, it was nonetheless
inflected with the usual run of cognitive biases. For example, the
23

See, e.g., JANis & MANN, supra note 17, at 81.

24 As we pointed out in note 11, supra, theoretical work on juries suggests that even
without individual level cognitive biases, collective cognitive limitations can arise.
25
If experts more or less agree about the range of appropriate public responses to a
problem, interest groups may defer to the experts' opinion and rethink their own positions. If the President and political leaders frame an issue in a certain way, they can influence some groups' perception of what is actually in the groups' best interest, or how much
groups should care about that perceived interest.

624
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President anchored on the questionable belief that there are sixtyfour lines of usable stem cells available at reasonable cost for the research, may have rendered a decision by exhaustion, and operated
under a strong form of the extremeness aversion. 2 6 The decision
seems (to us) awfully expensive, for it will slow down research that has
a tangible chance of saving untold millions from degenerative
27
diseases.
The President's decision also grants monopoly rights and rents to
the holders of the existing stem cell lines. Some of these are public
institutions, but others are private firms seeking private interests, and
28
may therefore get windfall profits from the President's decision.
However, the primary rents granted by the decision are the burdens
on people with degenerative diseases whose future treatment is being
sacrificed to satisfy the moral preferences of some religious groups.
Under this scenario, the deliberative process might have been little
more than a smokescreen for raw public choice and PPT calculations:
to assuage his base among the religious right, the President abandoned the more liberal funding scheme of his predecessor and
adopted a plan whose limits were acceptable to religious moderates
29
while rewarding institutions that could help the President's party.

Our own view is that the above calculation is too cynical. For example, it underestimates the President's range of discretion in this
matter. Many pro-life conservatives are open to stem cell research because they have relatives suffering from the targeted diseases (availability and representativeness heuristics), or because they credit the
medical researchers who made great claims for the fruits of the research (expert bias),30 Many pro-research moderates, in turn, supported the President's decision although it cut back (perhaps
drastically) on this research because they accepted the President's
26 See Katharine Q. Seelye & Frank Bruni, A Long Process That Led Bush to His Decision,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at Al (although President Bush engaged in thorough deliberative process, "pivotal moment" was his (erroneous) discovery that there are more than sixty
"genetically diverse" stem cell lines, a discovery which confirmed his impulse to reach a
"compromise" solution). But see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 64, Minus. . . , N.Y. TImNs, Sept. 9,
2001, § 4, at 2 (President's sixty-four stem cell lines include only a dozen or so that are
"ready" for research use).
27 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Scientists Urge Bigger Supply of Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2001, at Al (panel of scientific experts says that stem cell research will not be useful unless
more than sixty-four lines can be deployed).
28 SeeAndrew Pollack, The Promise in Selling Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, § 3, at
1 (reporting that Geron, a private biotech company, may receive a windfall from the President's decision because Geron owns several of the few viable stem cell lines).
29
See Richard L. Berke, Bush Appears to Have Straddled a Divide, N.Y. TImNES, Aug. 11,
2001, at All.
30
See Laurie Goodstein, Abortion Foes Split over Plan on Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2001, at Al.
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framing of the issue and deferred to his decision, and because they
31
felt it reflected a fair and open deliberation.
As Professors Cynthia Farina and Jeffrey Rachlinski suggest, the
contributions of cognitive psychology to political theory might be
even more ambitious. Within the republican tradition, they conceptualize Congress as the primary policy-setting institution, having access
to substantial reservoirs of expertise, with the President, agencies, and
courts as fine-tuners and occasional correctors of statutes adopted by
Congress.32 We do not see why the insights of cognitive theory could
not also be adapted to the rational choice tradition. Such an addendum would focus on the decisionmaking biases of interest groups as
well as public decisionmakers. Enriched with insights from cognitive
psychology, public choice and other rational actor models would have
a more interesting account of the regulatory state: because the original sales are often made with misconceptions on both sides (legislative
sellers and interest group buyers), much of the horse-trading is after
the fact within the executive department or independent agencies.
The more ambitious the statutory bargain, the greater the need for
buyers to have access to the implementing organ.
The table below encapsulates our understanding of different theories of the regulatory state, and how cognitive psychology might enrich or complexify standard political science accounts. Recall that we
do not believe cognitive psychology makes an independent contribution to thought about the overall norm against which government decisions ought to be measured. Its contribution is not to thinking
about the ends of politics, but rather to thinking about the means by
33
which decisions are reached.
II
INSTrrUTIONAL ROLES AND LnMTs ON THE CUiRENT
CONTRIBUTION OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

The foregoing analysis is at the most general and theoretical
level. Does cognitive theory also offer contributions at the more specific and concrete level of institutional design? Cutting-edge work in
public law says it can, and scholars in this Symposium have developed
intelligent analyses along these lines. Farina and Rachlinski, for ex31 See Seelye & Bruni, supra note 26.
32 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 588-600 (2002).
33 There is a special sense in which cognitive science may contribute to criticizing the
ends of governmental policies. Insofar as the Kantian slogan-ought implies can-is accepted, cognitive psychology may show that some governmental ends are impermissible
because agencies cannot administer means to achieve them (because of cognitive biases).
Such a demonstration would be exceedingly difficult, however, because it entails evalua-

tion of all possible means to reach the end in question.
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ample, maintain that Congress is the best institution to devise policy,
and that agencies are the best institution to fill in the details of a statutory scheme, but that narrow review of those decisions by the President and the judiciary will edit out some biases post hoc.3 4 Mark

Seidenfeld argues that process-based judicial review of agency decisions under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard will not only catch
errors after the fact, but will also discourage some kinds of error ex
ante. 35 Although these scholars essentially defend the institutional
status quo, this kind of thinking could just as well be deployed to criti36
cize current arrangements, as Rachlinski has done elsewhere.
These are interesting and informative Articles. Their accounts
enrich our understanding of the pitfalls in legislative and administrative decisionmaking. And their arguments are on the whole quite cogent. But not completely. We are not (yet) persuaded of these
particular defenses, and our doubts rest upon several general difficulties with using the insights of cognitive psychology to support or criticize particular roles for particular institutions. The doubts that follow
also pose limits on our ability to advance beyond the general observations about regulatory pathology that we developed in the first part of
this Comment.
1. The Context Problem. To begin with, anything but the broadest
generalizations about the specialized roles of our public institutions
are treacherous because those roles will or should vary according to
context, especially among the different subject matters that are regulated in our society. Farina and Rachlinski's argument that Congress's
committee system offers the best opportunity to filter out the most
severe decisionmaking biases and heuristics is hard to accept without
a systematic survey. The areas we know best are those where committees did not do this, and sometimes where committees pressed Congress in rather extreme directions. For instance, the most significant
legislation concerning the rights of lesbians and gay men in recent
history was the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),37 whose committee
report is a virtual cornucopia of decisionmaking biases. The House
Judiciary Committee anchored its report on the threat to marriage
posed by "homosexual marriage," but never explained how excluding
committed couples contributed to strengthening an institution al-

34 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 32, at 555-600.
35 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing; Social Conformity, andJudicialReview ofAgency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REa. 486, 509-12 (2002).
36 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsigh4 65 U.
Cni. L. REv. 571 (1998).
37
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738c (Supp. V 1999)).
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ready weakened by high rates of divorce and spousal abuse.3 8 Indeed,
the committee's rationale is illogical on its face: if marriage has been
weakened by easy-exit rules (no-fault divorce), how does expanding
the institution to include same-sex couples contribute to its decline?
One is left with the conclusion that this consequentialist argument was
a stand-in for the committee's closeted concern, that lesbian and gay
couples might be accorded the same dignified marital status as heterosexual couples. Although DOMA is a dramatic example-so be on
your toes lest you fall prey to the availability heuristic-it is sadly representative of congressional committee agenda-setting for issues af39
fecting lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.
Committee work in other areas of law has been more successful
in our opinion, but others disagree. For example, we admire the Endangered Species Act (ESA) ,40 perhaps because our thoughts are
anchored on the idea of species preservation and because ourjobs are
not in peril due to the ESA. Other scholars, however, have criticized
the statute as one inspired by a few horror stories (availability and
representativeness heuristics) and adopted without a careful analysis
of the costs it imposed on farmers, ranchers, and foresters (egocentrism bias).41 Like DOMA, the ESA may or may not be representative of
congressional committee deliberation regarding issues of national
consequence. Only a systematic survey can provide us with more than
42
mere hypotheses.
Similarly, Seidenfeld's notion that process-based judicial review of
agency rulemaking will reduce agency errors by introducing greater
accountability is a generalization that does not seem to hold true for
38
For analysis of the committee's rationales, see Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and
DOMA: Why the Defense of MarriageAct Is Unconstitutional 83 IowA L. REv. 1 (1997), as well as
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FuTuRE OF GAY
RIGHTS ch. 1 (forthcoming 2001).
39
For earlier examples of crazy congressional committee recommendations regarding the rights of sexual minorities, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY.AW: CHALLENGING
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 35-36, 69-70, 132-34 (1999) (national immigration laws,

1917-1990); id. at 36-37, 174-75, 183-95 (national military policy, 1920-1993); id. at
60-61 (law criminalizing consensual sodomy and incarcerating "'sexual psychopaths'" in
the District of Columbia); id. at 67-69 (describing congressional committee declarations
seeking to purge federal employment of "'homosexuals and other sex perverts'" and to
press FBI and local police to seek out and expose such people).
40
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1994)).
41 For critique of the ESA along these lines (but without the psychology jargon), see,
for example, RICHARD J. TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FuTuRE: U.S. POLITICS AND THE PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 91-109 (1990); David S. Wilcove, The Promise and the Disap-

pointment of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 275 (1998).
42 Even a systematic survey would pose methodological difficulties. For example, it is
often hard to figure out whether a decision reflects a cognitive bias. Our benign view of
the ESA contrasts with the critical view of scholars cited in note 41, supra-ideological
anchoring and cognitive dissonance pervasively influence such judgments.
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all agencies. Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst's study of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is a history of regulatory and cognitive failure. According to Mashaw and Harfst, not only
did judicial review fail to correct agency mistakes, but it induced mistakes. At best, judicial review slowed down needed agency action; at
worst, judicial review undermined the agency's sense of accountability
and contributed to the collapse of effective auto safety regulation in
the United States. 43 Seidenfeld would presumably respond that judicial review of NHTSA rules was more scrutinizing than he is proposing, but the review examined by Mashaw and Harfst was, ostensibly,
hard-look process-based review of the sort Seidenfeld defends.
More generally, we question Seidenfeld's assumption that judges
engaging in hard-look review will or even can keep their views about
the substance of regulations entirely separate from their views about
the process. Although Seidenfeld believes that this assumption must
44
hold in order for judicial review to create accountability benefits,
there is an impressive body of literature maintaining that ideology influences judges' review of agency decisions under hard-look kinds of
review. 45 If a judge thinks that a rule is slanted too much toward industry concerns, the empirical studies cited below suggest that she is
much more likely to find the process defective, perhaps because of
cognitive dissonance and anchoring. It seems inevitable that judicial
review of agency rulemaking-whatever the standard-will sometimes
be influenced by judges' views about the underlying statute itself as
well as the agency's rule. So the context within which hard-look review actually occurs is sensitive not only to subject matter, but also to
the respective ideologies of the agencies and judges involved.
43

SeeJERRY L. MAsHAIW & DAVID L. HARFsr, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFTY 84-105,

224-54 (1990).
44 See Seidenfeld, supra note 35, at 512-13 (stating that for accountability to be beneficial under cognitive theory, the decisionmaker must perceive that the evaluation of her
decision will be based on her decisionmaking process rather than outcome of her decision). We doubt that substance is entirely separate, see sources cited infra note 45, but even
if it were, we doubt agency decisionmakers would believe it.
45
See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., JudicialHostility Toward Labor Unions?Applying the
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999); Richard L.
Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997); see
also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,JudicialPartisanshipand Obedienceto Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowingon the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (describing courts of
appeals' partisan approaches to following Supreme Court precedent). Seidenfeld, supra
note 35, at 519-21, smartly responds that the foregoing literature is hotly contested, e.g.,
William S. Jordan, III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from a
Decadeof HardLook Remands ofEPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45, 98-99 (2001), and does not
claim that ideology is the only relevant variable. Fair enough, but a review of the literature
suggests that broad claims cannot be made about judges' cognitive ability to limit their
attention in hard-look cases to nothing but the procedure. The burden is on Seidenfeld to
establish that hard-look review is nothing more than process review, and that is a burden
he cannot sustain with the current studies.
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2. The Problem of Offsetting Biases. Our second difficulty with deploying cognitive theory to explain or prescribe general institutional
roles is that most proposals anchor on the biases of the institution
being checked while minimizing the biases of the institution doing
the checking. 46 Consistent with conventional wisdom among political
scientists, theories of institutional role have thus far posited that Congress makes policy and agencies carry it out. The value added by cognitive psychology is to support the claim that review of agency
decisions by the President or the courts will correct some of the decisionmaking errors that agencies commit. Farina, Rachlinski, and
Seidenfeld make sensible arguments for the proposition that agencies
make predictable mistakes. We are not as persuaded that the mistakes
made by agencies will be corrected by courts, however. 47 Judges are
generalists and prone to defer to agencies making policy judgments in
areas that are highly technical or otherwise beyond the ken of judges.
The expert-deference bias, therefore, suggests that courts will not correct all or perhaps even most substantive mistakes made by agencies
regulating technical subject matters.
Seidenfeld makes the sensible (albeit hard to verify) point that
judges ought to be less deferential and more willing to correct process
mistakes made by such agencies. But in correcting process mistakes,
judges are particularly prone to introduce new costs into the system:
hard-look review that overturns substantively okay rules because of
mistakes in agency procedure runs a great risk of slowing down the
implementation of needed agency rules at the very least and probably
makes some agencies excessively cautious. 48 If hard-look review will
be segregated from review of the merits of an agency rule, as
Seidenfeld insists, a lot of really good rules will be overturned and
remanded to agencies. This seems like a significant albeit indeterminate cost of hard-look review. Unless the accountability benefits of
such review are demonstrably large-which is not clear at this pointthe cost might well outweigh the benefits.
More generally, judges will introduce their own cognitive biases
into the evolution of public policy, whatever the ostensible standard of
46
This is a kind of framing effect engaged in by proponents generally, and the careful reader will detect this tendency in your current authors when they advance positive
proposals later in this Comment!
47
Furthermore, for the reasons just developed, we are not persuaded that hard-look
review satisfies Seidenfeld's accountability criteria laid out in note 44, supra.
48
See MASHAW & HAR=ST, supra note 43 (finding that hard-look review crippled
NHTSA's ability to vigorously implement highway safety law because of delays and incoherences introduced by process-obsessed judges); R. Shep Melnick, AdministrativeLaw and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1992) (arguing that process-based
reversals will deter agency rulemaking); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Two Problemsin Administrative
Law: PoliticalPolarity on the Districtof Columbia Circuit andJudicialDeterrenceofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 308-13 (1988) (same).
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review. The cognitive biases of judges are an under-researched terrain, and so the depth of concern is and will long remain unclear.
Cognitive theory, supported by experience that lawyers have had with
judges, suggests some important biases that we should expect to find
among judges:
" Overconfidence. In areas judges know well, such as discrimination law, civil and criminal procedure, and the common law
fields (contracts, torts, property), one would expect judges to
be overconfident when reviewing agency decisions. That overconfidence is sometimes exacerbated by a hindsight bias,
whereby judges looking back on events will view them as more
likely to occur than would have been rational beforehand. 49
" Availability and RepresentativenessHeuristics. Because judicial review frequently occurs in the context of specific facts and hardships suffered by particular plaintiffs, one would expect judges
to overvalue and overgeneralize the experience of the litigants
before them.
" Text Fetishism and Path Dependence. In our view, judicial review
introduces a variable into agency policymaking that often has
an uncertain relationship to optimal policy: the rule-of-law requirement that agencies and judges follow "clear" statutory
texts and judicial precedents. Judges take this rule very seriously and often reverse agencies because they disagree with the
agency's interpretation of the words of the statute; 50 less often,
they reverse because the agency's sensible application is inconsistent with an old judicial precedent. 51
Additional judicial biases involve the kinds of mistakes that everyone
makes, such as information overload (a particular concern when
judges review decisions about technical matters), schema bias (a concern for politicized issues like affirmative action and abortion), and
egocentrism (which for some judges becomes an egomania heuristic).
Return to the issue of stem cell research. Before the President
made his decision, a group of doctors sued the Administration for
suspending the funding of stem cell research. 52 Assume that the Supreme Court ultimately reviews the Administration's decision. Legaily, there is a good chance the Court would rule that the
See Rachlinski, supra note 36.
Although courts are supposed to defer to agency interpretations of their governing
statute, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and
to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to agency factfinding, neither applies if the court
believes the agency's decision runs against the statute's plain meaning, see, e.g., MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 226-29 (1994).
51 See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 419
(1986).
52
Thomson v. Thompson, Civ. No. 01-CV-0973 (D.D.C. filed 2001).
49

50

632

CORAELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:616

Administration violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to
proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 5 3 Would a reversal and remand ordering the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to follow the correct procedures produce a better
decision? Most doubtful. Would such a requirement impose marginally greater accountability on agencies generally? Maybe. But maybe
not.
If the Court reached the merits, its decision would involve interpretations of a 1993 federal statute that explicitly authorizes the HHS
to "conduct or support research on the transplantation of human fetal
tissue for therapeutic purposes,"5 4 and of subsequent appropriations
statutes that bar the creation or destruction of "human embryos for
research purposes. '55 These statutes press the law in different directions, and the Court would have to reconcile them and apply its reconciled interpretations to the Administration's new stem cell rule.
Arguments about the proper interpretation of either statute would
probably turn on the texts of the statutes-texts written by congressional committees that did not anticipate the precise issue before the
current Administration. 56 However the Court resolved this issue, its
approach would hardly seem well-suited toward instantiating the best
policy. Thus, it is hard to see how judicial review would correct cognitive errors, yet it is easy to see how review could introduce new errors
57
from a policy perspective, even if not from a rule-of-law perspective.
3. MethodologicalProblems; Weeds in a Vacant Lot. The biggest limitation on the ability of law professors to rely on cognitive psychology
to defend particular institutional roles involves methodological
problems with applying psychology data to assess particular legal
problems. One methodological problem is that many of the biases
and heuristics have not been tested in real-world government settings. 58 Thus, there is no experimental basis for believing that all the
53 Cf Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 919-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (finding, in an unrelated case, that suspension of prior rules requires procedures
associated with substantive rulemaking).
54 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1 (a) (1) (1994).
55 Pub. L. No. 104-99, sec. 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996). The current version of this
appropriations language is in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
app. A, sec. 510, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-71.
56 It was not until 1998 that Dr. James Thomson, a plaintiff in the lawsuit against the
administration, derived stem cells from embryos, and that Dr. John Gearhart, also a plaintiff, derived stem cells from germ cells found in fetal tissue. See Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Thompson v. Thompson, Civ. No. 01-CV0973 (D.D.C. July 11, 2001).
57 The phenomenon described in the text would also infect process-based review of
agency decisions if the literature is correct that a judge's ideology affects his or her judgment even in hard look cases. See supra note 45.
58
See EDWARD G. CARMINES & RIcHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILIy AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT (1979) (standard social science account of requirements for reliable inferences).
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biases and heuristics apply at all to legislators, administrators, and
judges, or that they apply to institutional (as opposed to individual)
decisionmaking by these kinds of officials. Although psychologists
and others, including Rachlinski, are establishing an experimental basis for decisionmaking biases and their application to group as well as
individual decisionmaking, few if any of the tests have involved realworld figures, and so their conclusions remain somewhat provisional.
Another methodological problem arises from the fact that
demonstrated cognitive biases have grown like weeds in a vacant lot.
As documented biases have multiplied, it has become harder to reach
conclusions from them. In any given institutional situation, there will
be several potentially applicable-and potentially cross-cutting-biases. Furthermore, there is little basis for understanding how the different biases interact with one another. When do they cancel one
another out? When they cut in the same direction, are they additive
or multiplicative? What difference does context make? As to our
stem cell problem, we have no idea whether the biases that seem to
have afflicted the President's decision actually generated an irrational
decision, nor do we know whether the biases afflicting judicial review
would render such review productive or counterproductive. Our own
precommitments would press us toward criticizing the decision for restricting research too much, and surely that would drive our application of cognitive psychology to the decision. Deployment of heuristics
to criticize the President's decision would be like looking out over a
crowd and picking out our friends.
A word of caution is in order regarding the foregoing critique: it
is provisional-further research and modeling ought to ameliorate
our concerns. Nor are our criticisms limited to cognitive psychology:
our pessimism about the ability of cognitive psychology to resolve public law debates about institutional role is not very different from our
skepticism about the ability of rational choice theory to resolve the
same debates. 5 9 And we think cognitive psychology already is making
a genuine contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of public law. Consider the following example where there has been a significant (and growing) amount of empirical work.

59 Compare, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT REsPONSIBILITY. How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (providing a sophisticated political theory critique of congressional delegation to agencies), with David B. Spence & Frank Cross,
A Public Choice Casefor the AdministrativeState, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000) (putting forth a public
choice defense of congressional delegation).
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III
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC LAW
ISSUES WHERE THERE Is AN ADEQUATE EMPIRICAL

BASE: ISSUES IN MANAGING MASS
TORT LAWSUITS

Our skepticism knows its limits. Debates over the appropriate
role of juries and mechanisms for consolidated adjudication in toxic
tort cases are being enriched by experimental as well as theoretical
work by cognitive psychologists. 60 For the last twenty years, toxic tort
litigation (such as the asbestos litigation) has been handled in large
part through large class actions and mass consolidations. 61 Ostensibly, these are efficient ways to handle cases involving thousands of similarly situated victims, but cognitive psychology has generated robust
criticisms of consolidated cases whose liability and damages are set by
juries or-in fear of large jury verdicts-based upon the harms to a
few assertedly "representative" plaintiffs. Because social scientists and
law professors have generated context-specific research focusing on
this problem, some of the concerns we raised about the application of
cognitive psychology to issues of institutional structure are
62
ameliorated.
Contrary to attorney lore, empirical studies do not support the
proposition that juries are generally pro-plaintiff. In cases involving
ordinary injuries, corporate defendants are no more likely to be held
liable by juries or judges than other defendants. However, according
to long-term studies by the Institute for Civil Justice, "when they were
sued by plaintiffs with severe, permanent injuries, corporations were
found liable more often than other defendants," and such plaintiffs
were paid significantly larger awards-findings that were constant
over several decades. 63 This description fits the early asbestos cases, in
60 The analysis in this part draws from the statements of Professor Eskridge in testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary. See Jumbo Consolidations in Asbestos
Litigation: Hearing on H.t 1283 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(1999) [hereinafter Eskridge Testimony] (prepared statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Professor, Yale Law School), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/eskr07Ol.htm.
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (consolidations); seeDEBORAH
R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS (1985); THOMAS E. WIILLGING, ASBESTOS CASE
MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES (1985); THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1987); Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation:PostaggregativeProce-

dure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475 (1991).
62 Specifically, problems 1 (context specificity) and 3 (methodological concerns) are
greatly ameliorated by the studies described below. Problem 2 (offsetting biases afflicting
the proposed reform) is not negated in our account, but other scholars might be able to
ameliorate it.
63

AUDREY CHIN

&

MARK

A.

PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POcKETS: WHO WINS IN

COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 42-43 (1985). On juries' tendencies to be more generous on
damages issues, see, for example, Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REv. 1055 (1964) (comparingjury verdicts to judges' statements of what they would have
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which people dying of mesothelioma and various types of cancer were
suing corporate suppliers of asbestos. The sympathy effect in these
kinds of cases meant that juries tended to interpret scientific and
other evidence in ways relatively favorable to most-injured plaintiffs.
For this reason, juries have tended to undervalue expert evidence
showing that the asbestos plaintiff's lung cancer was just as likely
64
caused by his two-pack-a-day smoking habit, for example.
Plaintiffs' counsel can exploit the sympathy effect by associating
most-injured plaintiffs with less- or least-injured plaintiffs in a consolidated action. Researchers found this to explain the large verdicts in
some of the early asbestos consolidations. According to the researchers, there was what we call a piggyback effect jurors focused on the
plaintiff with the most serious injury and assumed, incorrectly, that
other less-injured plaintiffs would become similarly ill.65 The piggyback effect was due in part to anchoring: jurors latched onto the most
emotionally salient factor as an anchor, which was then adjusted by
other factors, rather than trumped by these factors. 6 6 Because of information overload, jurors could not process large amounts of infor67
mation and were therefore selective about what they remembered.
Information overload exacerbated the piggyback effect in complicated cases: jurors overloaded with information have tended to
anchor on dramatic and sympathetic plaintiffs whom the jurors then
relate to the other less-injured plaintiffs.
Unlike other recent applications of cognitive theory to legal institutions and proceedings, this one was immediately tested by social

scientists under law-like circumstances. Scientists tested the piggyback
effect in a controlled experimental setting involving several dozen

mock juries that heard the same case with variations for number of
awarded); David B. Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial Court

Information Network, ST. CT. J., Fall 1990, at 4-18.
64
Interviews with Texas jurors in consolidated asbestos litigation found this to be the
case, and the sympathy effect led the jury to disregard the judge's instructions. MOLLY
SELVIN & LARRY Picus, THE DEBATE OVERJURY PERFORANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT
AsBESTos CASE 24-35 (1987). For a dramatic example of the sympathy effect, see Dunn v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929 (D.V.I. 1991) (yielding a jury verdict of
$26,300,000 for a plaintiff who was perceived to be seriously ill and claimed to have
asbestosis).
65
See SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 64, at 24-25.
66
For example, surveys have shown that variation in the plaintiffs' requested damage
award strongly affects jury awards because of anchoring. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the
Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICr:
ASSESSING THE CFVILJURY SYSTEM 137, 157 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
67
SeeJane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurorsin Complex Cases, TRAL, Nov. 1985, at
66 (finding juries are most easily confused when evaluating conflicting medical and economic damages testimony in complex cases, including asbestos cases). For a vigorous defense ofjury abilities to process complex information, see Richard Lempert, CivilJuries and
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CVIL JURY SYSTEM,
supra note 66, at 181.
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plaintiffs and severity of injury.6 8 Consistent with the hypothesized
piggyback effect, scientists found that aggregation of most-injured
plaintiffs with less-injured plaintiffs significantly increased the mean
awards to the latter, and had the greatest piggyback effect on the leastinjured plaintiffs. With no evidentiary basis, the juries assumed that
the less- and least-injured claimants would ultimately suffer the same
fate as the most-injured claimants. Beyond the earlier hypothesis, researchers also found that the heterogeneity of the plaintiff group increased the variability of liability findings (i.e., more juries found no
liability at all), and that the most-injured plaintiffs received significantdy higher verdicts when their cases were tried alone. Therefore,
the piggyback effect proved to be more complex than hypothesized: it
seems to allow plaintiffs' counsel to get much greater recoveries on
average for less- and least-injured plaintiffs and thereby multiplies
counsel's contingency fees, but does so at significantly higher risk for
the most-injured plaintiff (lower verdicts and a heightened possibility
of nonrecovery).
This research suggests that normal consolidations are problematic in the asbestos context because of the sympathy effect as exacerbated by the piggyback effect. When the consolidation reaches
double digits, triple digits, or even higher, as has occurred in subsequent consolidations, juries are theoretically less able to do their jobs
objectively because of cognitive overload, which typically but unpredictably yields verdicts exceeding ideal valuations. In the jumbo consolidation, wherein a mob of plaintiffs sue a mob of defendants, these
fairness problems are further multiplied. The fairness problems are
exacerbated because the phenomena identified above become more
pronounced: many more least-injured or uninjured plaintiffs can piggyback onto the claims of most-injured plaintiffs. Indeed, the ratio of
least-injured or uninjured to most-injured can increase significantlyin a normal consolidation of five plaintiffs, at least 20% of the group
(one person) must be severely injured for the piggyback effect to kick
in. In a consolidation of one thousand plaintiffs, the effect can occur
when 5% or even 1% of the group is severely injured, especially if the
plaintiffs' counsel or a sympathetic judge is able to select the plaintiffs
who will "represent" the group at certain points at trial on liability or
damages. In many of the jumbo consolidations, plaintiffs' counsel
have either chosen the representative plaintiffs or played a major role
in making that choice.
For similar reasons as developed above, the problem of information overload can be expected to skew jury decisionmaking, thereby
68 Invin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of OutlierPresence,PlaintiffPopulation Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & Hum.
BEHAV. 209 (1988).
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making juries less predictable, less likely to differentiate among plaintiffs, and more likely to anchor on the most-injured plaintiff to deliver
awards in line with plaintiffs' exaggerated relief requests. The overload problem should also become unmanageable. A typical juror will
not be able to follow so many plaintiffs and defendants, and there is
little ajudge can do to help the jurors; many judges will be unable to
follow the evidence themselves. In light of the additional pressure to
get rid of hundreds or thousands of cases and procedural resistance
by defense counsel, judges in jumbo consolidations will also tend to
be less impartial. Shortcuts are inevitable, and given the sympathy
and piggyback effects, the shortcuts will tend to work against the interests of defendants and, sometimes, most-injured plaintiffs in favor of
less-injured and uninjured plaintiffs and their attorneys.
The foregoing are the reasons why the jumbo consolidations exacerbate the perverse effects of normal consolidations. Attribution
theory suggests that the perverse effects will be multiplied, sometimes
leading to extraordinarily large and unjustified verdicts for less-injured and uninjured plaintiffs and contingency fees for their counsel.
Under attribution theory, common characteristics of people who are
perceived to be members of a large group are attributed to situational
factors outside of any individual's control, while characteristics of isolated people tend to be attributed to dispositional factors such as
choice. 69 The resulting implications are that clustering asbestos plaintiffs in large groups-the goal of ajumbo consolidation-makes juries
less likely to attribute any personal responsibility for cancer to smoking or other choices by plaintiffs (to the extent that juries can even
distinguish among plaintiffs), and to find corporate defendants liable
for large damages. In their controlled mock jury experiment, the
scientists who tested the piggyback effect found this kind of collective
harm effect juries told that the injured plaintiffs were part of a large
group (hundreds) of victims were significantly more likely to attribute
responsibility (liability) for their injuries to corporations and to punish the corporations with larger damage awards compared to juries
who were told nothing about the larger victim population, or who
70
were told that it was modest (twenties) in size.
The foregoing synthesis of cognitive theory and empirical tests
tentatively supports the normative conclusion that jumbo consolidations and class actions lead to overvaluation of the most questionable
claims, undervaluation of the most deserving claims, and excessive
verdicts and settlements. This pattern of awards is not only inefficient
69

See Michael Ross & Garth J.O. Fletcher, Attribution and Social Perception, in THE

HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSycHOLOGY 73 (Gardner Lindsey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed.

1985).
70

See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 68, at 212, 225-26.
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and unfair to defendants, but it is also unfair to some most-injured
plaintiffs; it is greatly unfair to plaintiffs whose injuries are not yet
apparent, because asbestos companies have been driven bankrupt by
the huge awards and settlements, leaving these plaintiffs with no relief. Even judges are paying a price for their largesse. Believing that
jumbo consolidations will clear their dockets, judges have learned that
a structure for litigation that rewards marginal claims will produce
much more litigation and continue to clog dockets for decades. This
kind of evidence has also been adduced as a justification for creating
an administrative tribunal with injury schedules to handle these matters without juries. 7 1 One may debate the details or even the wisdom
of current proposals, but we think that psychological theory and empirical studies have made solid contributions to the critique of the
existing system and to arguments in support of administrative alternatives. Although administrative tribunals have their own biases, the
enormous potential for bias in the current system of judicially-encouraged consolidations as combined with jury trials is a compelling
argument for change.
IV
STRUCTURING PUBLIC LAWMAKING TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF
DISASTER: FEDERALISM, CHECKS AND BALANCES,
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

Another utility that cognitive theory may have is, simply put, illu-

mination. Like a lighthouse, the theory might more clearly cast the
nature of the institutional choices we have made and the trade-offs
such choices reflect in the modern state. Consider the following
thought experiment.
The Framers of our Constitution wanted energetic governance
but were fearful of an overbearing government and of radical, year-toyear shifts in state policies and rules. 72 Assuming this goal, cognitive
theory would suggest that the Framers should have avoided a parliamentary system in which an essentially unicameral legislature selects
the chief executive and exercises plenary authority. Theoreticallyand therefore subject to our earlier cautions-one would expect this
governmental design to be particularly susceptible to the following
decisionmaking biases:
71 See, e.g., Eskridge Testimony, supra note 60; Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation
Crisis: Is There a Need for an AdministrativeAlternative, 13 CARDozo L. Ruv. 1819 (1992).

For a helpful overview, see generallyJACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MENINGS: POLITiCS
(1996). This is a thesis we modeled in PPT
terms in William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
72

AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

523 (1992).
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" availability and representativeness heuristics, such that the government would be prone to overreacting to dramatic events or
perceived crises by adopting statutes tougher than a longer
view of the situation would demand;
" egocentrism, whereby the legislature would assume that the entire populace was similar to members of the legislature or their
allies, as well as attribution of bad choices to minorities who do
not conform, such that the legislature would impose excessive
disabilities on minorities; and
• polarization, whereby the legislature and its committees would
adopt extreme positions as to matters on which there was little
disagreement within the legislature.
In fact, the defenders of the Constitution made arguments that resonate with these concerns:
" Madison's FederalistNo. 10 worried that temporary "faction [s]"
would form around an emotional issue to push ill-conceived
73
laws through the legislative process.
" Hamilton's FederalistNo. 78 worried that the legislature would,
74
when in ill-humor, adopt "unjust and partial laws."1

Madison's Federalist No. 10 worried that homogeneous elites
generally dominated small republics, with malign results for
75
minorities.
These parallels between modem theory and historical argumentation
are per se interesting and give us a different perspective as to the
Framers' design.
As every high school student used to know, the delegates at Philadelphia made a number of creative choices as to the design of our
constitutional governance. One can understand or defend these design choices after the fact as strategies to offset the most feared decisionmaking biases. Thus, the Framers' division of the legislature into
two different chambers with the members of the "upper" chamber
having long and staggered terms ought to ameliorate the predictable
operation of the availability and representativeness heuristics. Ditto
for the Article I, Section 7 requirement that bills must be presented to
the President, who may veto them before they become law. Such a
complex design for making statutory law will be slower to respond to
national problems, but will do so in a more moderate fashion that
"

73
THE FEDERAuST No. 10 (James Madison). Note that Madison's idea of a temporary
emotionally charged faction is not the same as the modem concept of a permanent and
quite rational interest group.
74 THE FEDERALIT No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
75 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). Madison's idea of a minority did not focus on ethnic, racial, or sexual minorities, as we do today. Property owners were a "minority" for whom Madison was especially solicitous, but the term probably would have
connoted religious minorities in that era as well.
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takes into account more perspectives. 76 The Framers' decision to separate lawmaking (Congress, with a presidential veto) from law implementation (the President and the Supreme Court) is also a rational
response to the most feared legislative decisional biases. If Congress
tried to make radical changes affecting Americans' traditional liberties and freedoms, the independent implementers could be expected
to apply the same rules to the allies of those seeking enactment and,
more generally, to soften or even nullify the most extreme
applications.
The foregoing exercise does not rely on cognitive psychology to
prove or demonstrate the normative attractiveness of our institutional
design; its goal is merely to articulate that design in terms that give us
a new angle for understanding the Framers' choices. One payoff for
this kind of thought experiment is that it gives us a fresh perspective
on some intense debates about more controversial theses regarding
the Framers' expectations. As the best example, a group of legal
scholars maintain that the Framers contemplated a unitary Executive,
whereby all executive (implementational) power was concentrated in
the hands of one person, the President; under this theory, any and all
"executive" officials are responsible to that one mega-official. 77 Legal
historians have vigorously criticized this theory as anachronistic. 78
Cognitive psychology lends mild support to the critics in this way:
if, as historians document, the Framers' primary fear was the cluster of
the liberty-restricting decisional biases identified above, the last thing
they would have wanted was a powerful single decisionmaker who
could operate independently of other government organs. Such an
official could easily fall into a maverick mode of decisionmaking, and
social scientists have suggested that the President is particularly susceptible to the availability and representativeness heuristics. 79 This
idea lends support to those theorists who posit that the Framers did
not intend a rigid separation of powers and wanted a system of checks
and balances as much as a system in which each branch is specialized.
Those notions can be criticized from a variety of perspectives, but cognitive theory helps us understand the underlying pathologies that
were apparently the Framers' targets.

76 We model the moderation point, and demonstrate the link to the Framers' actual
expectations, in Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 72, at 528-33.
77 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 569 (1994).
78 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1755-76
(1996).
79

See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND

FIASCOES 19-47 (1982) (studying the decisional mistakes in the Bay of Pigs fiasco). We owe
this idea and reference to Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 32.
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We are, therefore, open to the notion that cognitive psychology
enriches our understanding of the overall design and dynamics of lawmaking and law implementation in the United States. There is another interesting dimension of this point. If one learns nothing else
from cognitive psychology, it is that smart, well-motivated, and informed decisionmakers make mistakes. We think political systems will
make lots of mistakes whatever their structure. A good strategy for
dealing with inevitable mistakes is to minimize the risk of large-scale
disaster on the one hand, and to obtain useful feedback that helps
identify mistakes on the other hand. The trick is to learn from our
mistakes without paying too high a price.
This trick provides an underappreciated reason why the Framers
chose to structure our governance around the concept of federalism:
the state and the national governments can learn from each other's
mistakes! Federalism permits American governance to engage in mistake-filled experiments without paying too high a social cost. This theory is simple.8 0 A political entrepreneur proposes a bold policy:
banning cellular phones on the highway. A lot of accidents occur
when drivers are using cellular phones, but users testify that they
would suffer economic and other losses if they could not use cellular
phones when driving. In balancing these various concerns, under either a public choice or a republican theory of politics, both lobbyists
and legislators fall prey to decisionmaking biases: they overgeneralize
from isolated but dramatic accidents; anchor onto a point of view with
which they are familiar (or a group to whom they are indebted) and
ignore evidence to the contrary; rush to legislate if they perceive the
issue as one that is urgent; and so forth. There may be no clear right
answer, or the answer might be obscure to the legislators. In most
states, nothing is adopted, but State A adopts the radical policy of barring cellular phones by anyone driving a vehicle in the state. This
might be a bad rule, but this is an error that will likely be exposed by
interested drivers or their insurers. If experience with the rule shows
it to be a bad one, the social costs of the rule will be localized (and of
course, the rule can be repealed). If experience shows the rule to be
a good one, that experience becomes knowledge that other states can
use to reduce their uncertainty as they debate the issue.8 ' If several
states have similarly good experiences, the federal government is
more likely to adopt the rule on a national basis. At that point, the
risks of making a huge mistake have been very much reduced.
80 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
81
Cf PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995) (states have incentives to
repeal stupid police power rules and adopt smart ones, lest they lose citizens and business

to other states).
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This simple theory is unfortunately subject to a simple problem:
interest groups and legislators in other states and at the federal level
will draw mistaken inferences from State A's experience because of
the familiar cognitive biases and heuristics, of course. Thus, insurers
in State B will seize upon any diminution in State A accident levels as
evidence that a radical ban of cellular phones is a good policy; cellular
phone companies will seize upon any business relocation away from
State A as evidence that the rule is bad for the economy. Nonetheless,
the only claim that federalism needs to make is that this process
reduces the risk of really bad decisions, not that it eliminates bad decisions altogether. It is plausible to think that the more focused experiment reflected by this example generates better, more pertinent
information, and that flawed decisionmakers can thereby make fewer
errors. The same decisionmaking advantage ought to accrue from nationwide statutes that allow states to devise their own mechanisms for
implementation (within certain parameters, to avoid races to the
bottom).
V
AMELIORATING NORMATIVE RISKS: SUBSTANTIVE CANONS OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A larger point that emerges from our line of thought is that public law is an ongoing process of error and amelioration, new error and
new adjustment. Any statute that seeks to affect human conductespecially statutes seeking strong changes in conduct (such as the cellular phone law)-will be adopted under conditions of uncertainty,
and erroneous inferences will be drawn. Legislators delegate a lot of
lawmaking to agencies because of the difficulty they face when correcting their own errors, including cognitive dissonance as well as the
excessive costs of monitoring and re-legislating. One role of agencies
and possibly of courts should be to correct the clearest errors and to
mitigate the harm that can be caused by possible errors. This lesson
of cognitive psychology finds direct support in the Framers' original
expectations with regard to Article III's 'Judicial Power" in the U.S.
Constitution,8 2 and is probably congenial to the judicial power
granted by many state constitutions as well. A powerful argument for
dynamic statutory interpretation-statutes evolve after enactment and
are increasingly applied in ways that the authors would not have expected-rests in the idea of a cautious learning curve for public law.
Statutory interpreters should construe laws to reduce the risk of unan82
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 74, at 470 (stating that courts exist in part to
"mitigate" the effect of "unjust and partial laws"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:
Early Understandingsof the "JudicialPower" in Statutoy Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUI.
L. REv. 990 (2001).
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ticipated error costs of a large magnitude. This may sound like an
activist approach to statutory interpretation, and it may well be, but it
is one followed by the most anti-activist judges.
For example, Justice Scalia bent the hell out of the language of
the Bankruptcy Code in his BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. ruling that
courts will not second-guess the price fetched by the bankrupt's property at a foreclosure sale.8 3 He justified the nontextual interpretation

as necessary to avoid the risk of unsettling state property law. We do
not know whether this risk was as large as Justice Scalia feared, but it is
the sort of consideration that we think is valid for statutory cases. By
the way, one of us has been a vigorous critic of the decision in question because it slights both the text and the expectations of the enacting Congress,8 4 but we believe the cognitive psychology insight
provides a fulcrum to consider the decision in a friendlier fashion.
Most of the substantive canons of statutory construction can be
defended along these cognitive lines, 8 5 and so psychological theory

provides a fresh way to understand the function of these canons. The
rule of continuity, requiring clear evidence that the legislature wanted
to abandon a longstanding policy, rests most obviously on this cognitive point, for such a rule makes it less likely that productive or reliedupon laws will be inadvertently unsettled by new legislation.8 6 The
rule of lenity, which requires a statutory clear statement before courts
will apply criminal laws to an accused, can best be justified as reducing
the risks of terrible error. This would be most true if the rule were
strongly applied to acts which are not malum in se (per se awful). The
various federalism canons, exemplified in the Scalia opinion above, also
have this feature. In adopting bold public policies, Congress tends to
overlook their costs, especially their burdens on the states, and the
federalism canons operate to reduce the risk that Congress will impose large burdens on the states without a full and fair discussion of
those burdens and their justifications. All of these canons bend statutory texts in ways not otherwise justified by their words, or by the origi83 Compare BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (Scalia, J., for the
Court), with id. at 549 (SouterJ., dissenting) (showing persuasively that both statutory text
and legislative history supported rule that courts ought defer only when the sale price is
"'reasonabl[e]'" under the statute (alteration in original)).
84 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 TermForeword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 83-86 (1994) (criticizing BFP as an
example of "stealth constitutionalism" and finding the Souter dissent more persuasive).
85 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking,45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619-29 (1992) (surveying the
federalism canons in particular and analyzing various arguments pro and con); see also
Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 84, app. at 97, 102-04 (listing the Supreme Court's federalism and other canons of statutory construction).
86 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutoiy Interpretation,67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921 (1992).
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nal expectations of legislators. Their main justification is grounded
on notions of fairness and political theory, but cognitive psychology
would also appear relevant to their defense and articulation.
Notwithstanding the canons, courts are probably not the best editors of cognitive errors by the legislature. Conventional wisdom has it
that agencies are in the best position to correct errors. 87 In cognitive
psych-speak, one might say that the overconfidence bias characteristic
of agencies pales in comparison with the many more cognitive
problems that would be encountered if courts or the presidency were
the primary critic. If this is correct, it is a powerful argument for the
Chevron doctrine, whereby courts are supposed to defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of the laws they are charged to implement.88
Indeed, if the conventional wisdom is correct, then many of the Supreme Court decisions overturning agency actions are not-especially
those decisions resting on hypertextualism.
For an example of the complexity of our analysis, consider MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.89 In
MCI, the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Communications
Commission's exercise of discretion to "modify" statutory rate filing
rules in having granted blanket exemptions to nondominant carriers.
The Court's reason was that the word "modify" only allowed a "moderate" change, not a big one. This reason strikes us as rather lame. One
definition of "modify"' is to make a big change, 90 and the Commission's change was fully in the spirit of the deregulatory statute. However, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court concluded with the
suggestion of a better reason: interpreting the statute to allow the
agency to make wholesale changes might be okay in the present case
(as the dissent argued) but created great risks of bad policy if the
agency were wrong. The choice to make really bad policy should be
left to Congress; agencies are best situated to elaborate and apply what
Congress has written, not write a whole new statutory scheme. 9 1 Cognitive psychology not only provides some reasons why this norm might
be correct and useful, but also links it with choices the Framers made
when they drafted and argued for adoption of the Constitution.
Again, a right-wing decision we have criticized in the past 92 proves to
87 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
88 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
89
512 U.S. 218 (1994).
Compare id. at 239-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing dictionaries and common us90
age, including use in legal cases), with id. at 225-29 (Scalia, J., for the Court) (making
sport of dictionaries deploying the term so broadly).
91 See id. at 233-34; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
159-60 (2000) (citing MCI with approval and following the holding).
92 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 84, at 73-76.
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have more resonance once considered in light of cognitive psychology. The lighthouse function we noted before has relevance to debates about statutory canons.
VI
CONCLUSION: COGNITIvE THEORY AND STRUCTURING
LAWMAKING TO REDUCE BIAS

Return to this important question of public law: How do we structure lawmaking to reduce biases? Political scientists as well as lawyers
have tackled this question from within the public choice and republican traditions. This Symposium poses the question: What, if anything,
do theories of cognitive psychology add to this academic discourse?
There are three potential contributions that can and are being made
by the ever-growing body of heuristics and biases identified by cognitive psychologists. One contribution is critical; two are positive.
1. Positive Theory: IlluminatingDescriptions. Cognitive theory may
be useful as a vocabulary for explaining or even rationalizing institutional arrangements, including legal doctrines, that constitute the lawmaking process. For example, one can understand the rule of lenity
as a notice requirement for criminal defendants or as a rule for allocating decisionmaking responsibility for important moral judgments
entailed in criminal law. Cognitive psychology suggests another way of
explaining the popularity of this canon: because judges will be prone
(because of the availability heuristic, hindsight bias, etc.) to attribute
criminal liability to particular defendants, they need a rule that requires them to think twice and find a targeted source for such liability
in legislation. Such theories may also help us understand how doctrines such as the role of lenity actually operate. Conventional wisdom supposes that the rule of lenity operates with special force when
the alleged criminal conduct is a malum prohibitum (a crime because
the legislature has made it so) and not malum in se (intrinsically evil).
Psychology tells us why this may be so: when evaluating an accused
criminal, the judge will tend to anchor on her initial impressions of
what the criminal has done and will interpret operative legal texts
through the lens of those normative impressions. Where the defendant's actions are mala in se, most judges will tend to read the legal
materials against the defendant; where the actions are mala prohibita,
many judges will read the materials more leniently. This also helps
explain the frequent law-professor complaint that the rule of lenity is
unevenly applied: if some judges view the malum as intrinsically bad
while others see it as only prohibitum, then their legal interpretations
will tend to diverge.
So, too, one might think of federalism and separation of powers
as mechanisms to reduce cognitive errors. Recall our thought experi-
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ment: the justifications given by the Constitution's Framers can be explicated in the argot of psychology. Theories of cognitive psychology,
under this vision, complement other theories as explanations, but not
necessarily as complete justifications, for legal doctrines and institutional arrangements. At the very least, this deployment is illuminating. And it might be more.
2. Critical Theory. Theories of cognitive psychology can also be
fertile sources for thinking critically about legal doctrine, institutional
arrangements, and even general theories about either. For example,
one might criticize the notice justification for the rule of lenity along
psychological lines: given the enormous complexity of the federal or
state criminal code, few if any purported criminals can know which of
their activities are actually criminal; information overload makes notice an unrealistic aspiration. This kind of theory can also raise questions about separation of powers and federalism. For instance, a fair
amount of cognitive scholarship questions a separation of powers that
vests a great deal of decisionmaking authority in one person, such as
the President.
Cognitive psychology must also be taken into account in big-theory discussions of public decisionmaking. Long gone are the days
when republican theorists could opine that group deliberation, simpliciter, will typically yield reasoned decisions, or even more reasoned
decisions than those that could be made by single officials. Decisionmaking heuristics not only afflict group decisionmaking, but some of
those heuristics are distinctive to groups-informational cascades and
the tendency of like-thinking groups to reach extreme conclusions.
So cognitive psychology not only cautions us that well-meaning decisionmakers (or groups of them) will make errors, but also suggests the
directions those errors will take. Such theories are also relevant to
rational choice accounts of public decisionmaking, which assume either selfishly or ideologically motivated actors. Cognitive psychology
insists that both turf-protecting public officials and rent-seeking private groups are prone to systematic errors. On the one hand, public
officials may be even more prone to distribute rents to private groups
because, for example, the groups are able to manipulate public or
official opinion by exploiting vivid events or disasters. On the other
hand, rent-seekers may also be susceptible to manipulation and mistakes that reduce their willingness to extract goodies from the political
process.
3. Positive Theory: Prescriptions. At this point, theories of cognitive
psychology serve as a less secure foundation for making positive prescriptions about what legal doctrine should be and how legal institutions should be structured. This may be due, in part, to the fact that it
is easier to criticize and ascribe than it is to develop and defend a
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normative proposition, as Professors Farina, Rachlinski, and
Seidenfeld seek to do in this Symposium. The main limitation giving
rise to this difficulty is that there is, usually, not enough of an empirical foundation to justify application of abstract cognitive theory to
concrete legal settings. While cognitive theory can still generate useful explanations and criticisms, it cannot yet provide us with answers
to most such questions. There are a few areas where there is both a
theoretical and an applied experimental basis for making more solid
judgments; the phenomenon of jumbo consolidations in asbestos litigation is perhaps a good example. 9 3 And in the future there will be
many others.

93 For an early example applying cognitive theory and experimental studies to legal
rules, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage
Rues Consonant with the Economic and PsychologicalDynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083 (1984).

